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The Current Trade Context 
 
Since the collapse of the August 2003 Cancun meeting, it has become clear 
that a significant group of developing countries have suffered a sea change in 
their trade negotiation strategy and in the execution of trade agreements. The 
formation, coherence and persistence of coalitions such as the G-20 and its 
unwavering refusal to cede on agricultural issues or the inclusion of Singapore 
agenda items reveals a growing recognition by trade policymakers that 
developing countries should be alert, flexible, agile and prepared to adjust trade 
policy directions. This signalling shows that developing countries are juggling in 
all arenas to offset the mushrooming of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). 
Trade relations have ceased to be one-dimensional; they have now become an 
open-ended series of choices which demand agile non-scripted reactions. 
 
This potential shift makes it essential that organizations and individuals 
monitoring trade and development remain attentive to positions taken in both 
the multiple PTAs discussions now taking place as well as to the on-going Doha 
Round negotiations. Assumptions based on past trade strategies and the pre-
eminence of the WTO are a vast over-simplification of the current context. 
Apparently contradictory emphases are being simultaneously deployed and 
responses are far more rapid than has been the case in modern trade 
negotiating experience.  
 
In the early times of the Uruguay Round, developing countries had concentrated 
their efforts and rested their hopes for greater trading benefits within the 
multilateral framework. When it became evident that the Uruguay Round failed   2
to deliver a balanced outcome, developing countries became more receptive to 
PTAs both as a means to enhance their mutual trade relations and as a second-
best but realistic route for extracting concessions from the developed nations.  
 
The new generation of PTAs, mainly involve developing and developed 
countries (North-South agreements) as well as moving beyond the reduction of 
tariffs and into areas that comprise the so-called deep integration. It is this new 
brand of regionalism that has been actively promoted by the US and the EU in 
Latin America. In this quest to expand PTAs, Latin American countries have 
been the preferred partners. While the average African country belongs to four 
different trade agreements, the average Latin American country belongs to 
eight. Nonetheless, at best such asymmetric preferential deals offer small 
benefits beyond some improved market access. 
 
After more than a decade of proliferating PTAs, it also now seems clear that 
developing countries encounter often painful tradeoffs in negotiating 
agreements with economically and technically more powerful nations. This 
awareness and the continued unwillingness of the United States and the 
European Union (EU) to meet developing country expectations for greater 
access and reduced barriers to agricultural trade helps explain the emergence 
of coalitions such as the G-20 and the changing complexion of deliberations 
within the WTO and the Doha Round.  
 
Most governments in developing countries continue to make single-track 
analyses, merely taking into account costs and benefits related with tariffs and 
quotas in the trade-offs involved in the negotiations. However, the thrust of 
current negotiations is less and less about mere market access; it is 
increasingly driven by international investors seeking to protect their assets 
abroad and bind regulations that favour their interests. In this sense, the paper 
has selected two paradigmatic issues where these trends are clearly manifest, 
i.e., investment and intellectual property rights.  
 
The paper will analyze the current context of trade negotiations and the state of 
tension between multilateral and bilateral/regional agreements. It will assess   3
how unequal bargaining power has materialized in these negotiations and how 
the agenda of developed countries remains solidified, yielding few concessions. 
These processes will be examined in greater detail by looking at the EU-
Mercosur and the CAFTA-US efforts to reach trade accords. A series of 
observations is offered to indicate what positions, actions, and agreements are 
present in the issues of investment and intellectual property rights in both 
negotiations analyzed.  Both topics may be harbingers of what lies ahead in 
international trade negotiations in the medium term. 
 
 
Creative or Destructive Tension: Bilateral/regional versus multilateral 
agreements  
 
The “regionalism versus multilateralism” debate pits those who consider 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) harmful to the international trading 
system against those who believe that PTAs will increase global commerce. 
The question remains: are PTAs building blocks or stumbling blocks in 
constructing economic integration? Less examined is the issue of the 
relationship between PTAs and economic development. 
As integration deepened and international trade volumes grew, trade related 
imbalances and instabilities became more transparent, fostering tendencies to 
support domestic market protection in the more vulnerable countries. In this 
context, regionalism seemed to offer governments an easier way to resolve, if 
not side-step, issues pending in the multilateral arena. As a result, today almost 
all countries belong to one or more PTAs and more than one-third of world trade 
takes place within them as trade on a most-favoured-nation basis (MFN) 
becomes more an exception rather than the norm. This regionalist trend was 
reinforced in the 1990s, according to WTO statistics, with a majority of such 
agreements signed in the latter half of the decade. A recent World Bank report 
counts a total of 230 RTAs having been finalized since 1990, which account for 
more than one-third of world trade. (World Bank, 2004)  
   4
The acceleration of PTAs was first a reaction to the Uruguay Round’s slow pace 
in reaching consensual agreements, side-tracking developing countries for their 
lack of negotiating expertise and leaving them without any grounds for linking 
trade issues to pressing demands for economic and social payoffs. These 
obstacles remained in force after the Doha Round was launched, leading to a 
deepening of the trend in trade negotiations towards regional and bilateral trade 
agreements. Paradoxically, the most powerful actors, the United States and the 
EU, which most encouraged the multilateral system, are the principal drivers 
behind North-South preferential negotiations. Many of these negotiations are 
giving rise to ‘WTO plus’ agreements, raising serious concerns that unequal 
bargaining processes are giving rise to unequal outcomes, with richer countries 
gaining disproportionately.  
 
At a time when new coalitions appear to be shifting the balance-of-power in the 
WTO, regional negotiating processes could be simultaneously reinforcing the 
old inequalities. Moreover, the present generation of PTAs could herald a new 
model insofar as they extend geographically beyond adjacent countries. PTAs, 
such as the ones being negotiated between the US and a myriad of Latin 
American countries or the one between EU and Mercosur, reflect the imperative 
to push trade liberalization beyond neighboring regions, while avoiding the 
transaction costs of a WTO multilateral round.  
 
What is clear in the current environment is that both the US and the EU are 
engaged in a race to sign WTO-plus bilateral trade agreements with developing 
countries. Why are these bilateral agreements proliferating so intensively? In 
this paper the cases of the US-CAFTA agreement and the EU-Mercosur 
agreement will be considered for the perspectives they can yield on this issue.  
 
Rodrik (2000) argues that the world economy presents a political trilemma, 
centred on three nodal points: international economic integration, the nation-
state
1 and mass politics
2. The argument claims that it is impossible to 
                                             
1 “Territorial jurisdictional entities with independent powers of making and administering the law” 
(see Rodrik, 2000, p. 180)   5
implement policies for these three areas at the same time. An implication of this 
trilemma is that the only way to reach a truly economically integrated world is to 
create regional markets on a global scale. National sovereignty poses 
constraints on economic integration that can be overcome through the spread of 
regional agreements. Governments do not disappear but their powers become 
severely circumscribed by intergovernmental accords. Even in the absence of 
supranational institutions a process of mutual interpenetration and socialization 
is opened leading to gradual meshing and coordination of policies and 
procedures. (Tussie, 2003)  
 
This trilemma can be observed in the current bilateral negotiations.  For 
example, Latin American countries engaged in the process have experienced a 
reduction in political maneuverability. The bilateral agreements, particularly the 
ones encouraged by the US, mandate a very rapid pace and contain 
confidentiality clauses that impede publicizing draft agreements before they are 
signed. When finally publicized, only export gains are highlighted. This 
combination of time constraints and lack of transparency, not only hide real 
costs but also narrow the political and economic choices for developing 
countries.  
 
Attempts by policy-making bodies to insulate themselves from political 
participation and debate during negotiations leads to the sense that 
developmental goals are reduced to market access for certain products and the 
necessity of maintaining market confidence for external investors. In this 
context, microeconomic pressures capture the decision-making process. The 
tradeoffs in a negotiation are analyzed as bargaining chips rather than on their 
developmental merits.  
 
The difficulties surrounding information and transparency can be quite clearly 
seen in examining the CAFTA negotiating process. From the beginning, the 
CAFTA negotiations have been criticized for their lack of transparency. The 
U.S. insisted on a confidentiality clause that insured the secrecy of the 
                                                                                                                                  
2 “Political systems where a) the franchise is unrestricted; b) there is a high degree of political 
mobilization; and c) political institutions are responsive to mobilized groups” (op cit ).    6
negotiating texts. Salomon Cohen, initially the Guatemalan lead negotiator, 
stated that, “Ms. Regina Vargo (USTR negotiator) requested that the Central 
Americans sign a confidentiality agreement to ensure that what gets put on the 
table does not leave the room, or else the process would be interrupted.”   
Cohen was subsequently replaced as Guatemala’s lead negotiator. Even 
though Costa Rica’s Economy Minister confirmed Cohen’s remarks, the USTR 
publicly denied such a proposal ever existed. (McElhinny, 2004)  Similar 
confidentiality clauses were agreed to during negotiations between the U.S. and 
Chile and are in place with the on-going negotiations with Andean countries. 
The controversial nature of these negotiations is best exemplified by the 
ministerial crisis in Costa Rica once the agreement was concluded and made 
public.  
  
Central American legislators in every country within the CAFTA have 
complained about being shut out of the process. The CAFTA negotiating rounds 
established a mechanism for distributing information and for consultation called 
the “ room next door”. It was designed to provide civil society representatives 
and private sector observers with periodic updates by country negotiators. The 
first Costa Rica round inaugurated this mechanism and approximately eighty 
representatives of the business communities and 21 members of social sector 
organizations participated. As an element in the USTR’s five part public 
outreach strategy, the ‘rooms next door’ were to counter accusations by civil 
society organizations that there was a lack of transparency. However, its 
purpose was not necessarily to provide information regarding the details of the 
agreement under discussion.  
 
The strategy was not able to prevent enough information becoming available for 
interested parties to understand the general scope of the issues being 
negotiated. It did, nonetheless, circumscribe information to those with relatively 
easy access to alternative information sources and, thereby, discriminated 
against poorer sectors of the populations with limited ability to tap into such 
networks.  
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Generally speaking, the information made available in the rooms next door and 
through formal briefings was superficial. The quality of these exchanges varied 
considerably from country to country and with the nature of the relationships 
between civil society groups and private sector groups and the official 
negotiating team. Beyond the minimal amount of information provided, the 
principal utility of the “next door” arrangement was to neutralize opposition from 
business and to legitimate the process. (McElhinny,  2004)   
 
The political economy of unequal bargaining 
 
When a country wishes to further liberalization it can stick to a single route (be it 
unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral) or it can mix and match along the 
way. In general, there is a consensus over the superiority of the multilateral 
approach. However, given that the current international policy environment is 
not fully favorable to multilateralism, PTAs appear as an alternative route, at 
times supplementary and at times competitive, to expand liberalization. The 
problem is that PTAs are not necessarily welfare-enhancing. The potential 
negative effects led WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi to recently 
warn that the present juxtaposition of criss-crossing regional trade agreements 
creates a complex network of trade regimes that pose systemic risk to the 
global trading system. Besides such systemic risk, at in-country level PTAs add 
a heavy administrative burden on the limited resources and skills available for 
trade negotiations in developing countries.  
 
By definition, inter-state coalition-building is not feasible when only two 
countries are engaged in negotiations. PTAs appear to be driven by two 
opposite but in the end convergent forces. From a developing country 
perspective, PTAs offer an opportunity to gain additional access to highly 
regulated markets, such as textiles and foodstuffs, and to lock-in discretionary 
preferential access. From the US and EU perspective, the opportunity of 
obtaining a WTO-plus regulatory setting for intellectual property rights, 
investments and services provision holds out obvious advantages and asserts 
the primacy of market confidence over development and welfare goals. In this 
sense, bilateral trade agreements tend to overcome the absence of a minimal   8
degree of international consensus to smooth problems of governance and 
compliance within the WTO.  
 
Bargaining power depends heavily on market size; a regional trading unit tends 
to have more weight than its individual members. While bilateral initiatives tend 
to encourage cooperative solutions, at the same time they have the potential to 
weaken the bargaining power of developing countries. Moreover, bilateral 
negotiations often include non-trade issues that are pursued by special 
business interests and other powerful interest groups. Some of the difficulties 
encountered in the Doha round and the FTAA negotiations can be attributed to 
efforts to place non-trade specific issues on the table by such interests groups 
from the developed countries. In bilateral negotiations, developing countries, 
though aware of their unequal bargaining status, are less able to resist these 
impositions, as will be seen in the section on intellectual property and 
investment.* 
 
Drahos (2003) has broken down bargaining power in trade negotiations singling 
four basic dimensions:  
•  First, the state’s share of market power. A country (or region in the case 
of the EU) with a larger domestic market that other countries seeking 
greater access or upon which other countries are trade dependent is in a 
more favorable position in trade negotiations. 
•  Second, commercial intelligence networks. Networks composed by 
national trade bureaucracies, business organizations and individual 
corporations. They gather, distribute and analyze information related to 
their domestic and international markets which inform and shape the 
negotiating positions of policymakers.   
•  Third, coalition building capacity. State ability to include other actors, 
both public and private, in coalitions strengthens negotiating power. 
•  Fourth, the state’s domestic institutions. The rules that prevail over 
internal decision-making and the delegation of negotiating authority affect 
bargaining power. A country that binds its negotiators may in some  
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contexts increase their ability to determine the outcome of trade agreements.  
 
When these dimensions are taken into account, it becomes easier to 
understand why the US and the EU have strong bargaining power and 
developing countries, particularly when negotiating alone, are weaker in PTAs 
negotiations. Bilateral or interregional negotiations undermine networks of 
cooperation among countries with similar interests in order to resist the 
impositions of developed countries in trade negotiations. This is the strategy 
used by the United States offering bilateral agreements to Latin American 
countries with a view to encircle Mercosur and gradually erode its resistance to 
the FTAA. Moreover, an offer of market-access for a particular good or sector 
creates a vested interest that will lobby in the country. That lobby will push the 
PTA vigorously against all other interests, even as many of these interest 
groups are seldom aware they will be paying a cost by virtue of the principle of 
reciprocity in trade negotiations. The entrenched emphasis on reciprocity has 
added an omnipresent domestic dimension to all trade negotiations. 
 
From the point of view of the US, Robert Zoellick, USTR Representative, has 
explained clearly what the country seeks through expanding its range of 
bilateral trade negotiations. In Zoellick’s view, PTAs will trigger competitive 
liberalization as an alternative route to global free trade that cannot be reached 
in other forums. As the USTR Representative recognized, “America has stated 
its intentions plainly. We will promote free trade globally, regionally and 
bilaterally, while building support at home. By moving forward on multiple fronts, 
the U.S. can exert its leverage of openness, create a new competition in 
liberalization, target the needs of developing countries, and create a fresh 
political dynamic by putting free trade on to the offensive.” (Zoellick, 2002) 
Facing a lack of progress in the FTAA and multilateral negotiations, the US 
turned to bilateralism, often as a means of favoring loyal allies and punishing 
indecisive friends. The intrusion of domestic political considerations into the 
choice of trade patterns and the agendas covered by bilateral and regional 
agreements may favor particular business interest but often has negative 
impacts on long-term development goals. 
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As Winters (2000: 4) pointed out “the benefits of regionalism are likely to 
depend on finding the best partners. However, the popular notion of a natural 
trade partner is not useful in this regard. Neither large existing trade volumes 
nor are low transportation costs good reasons for artificially favoring a particular 
trade flow.” In this sense, PTAs might encourage intra-hemispheric agreements 
but extra-hemispheric agreements (such as South-South agreements) might 
have better potential returns as they usually encompass trade that is subject to 
higher barriers and is usually composed of higher value-added goods. 
 
At the same time, the coexistence of overlapping agreements poses dilemmas 
and challenges to developing countries. Latin America is a glaring example of 
Bhagwati’s spaghetti bowl metaphor: the criss-crossing of so many regional 
agreements that simply serve to open very specific and sometimes narrow 
markets. The FTAA was meant as a clearing house but the rush to a wide 
hemispheric free trade area was captured by bilateralism. Until the early 1990s 
most of the PTAs in the hemisphere were partial agreements, covering just a 
few sectors as had been the model under the 1960´s Latin American Free 
Trade Area which was supplanted in 1980s by the Latin American Integration 
Association. NAFTA and Mercosur represent turning points for the new patterns 
of integration in the region as both agreements are more ambitious in seeking 
economy-wide coverage. Another element in the regional trade picture is the 
role of Mexico and Chile which, by virtue of concluding networks of bilateral 
agreements, have become strategic hubs for trade expansion.  
 
This regional dynamic is also driving US trade policy which experienced a 
radical shift during the decade.  Formerly regarded as the locomotive of 
multilateralism, the US joined the rush towards bilateral and regional trade 
agreements, playing a catch-up with the rest of the world. The USTR 
Representative made the American strategy clear when in 2001 he lamented, 
“There are over 130 PTAs in the world today and the US is a party to only two 
of them.” (Zoellick, 2001). 
 
Since then, the US has concluded negotiations with twelve countries: The US 
Congress has been notified of negotiations with Morocco, the South African   11
Customs Union and Andean countries. It is also considering entering into PTAs 
with South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand, Egypt and at least three members of 
ASEAN (Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand). In these negotiations, the US has 
pursued a variety of national interests that former aide to the Clinton 
Administration, Richard Feinberg (2003) categorizes in the following way: 
 
•  Asymmetric reciprocity to open markets that take into account the 
interests of US traders and investors. 
•  Competitive liberalization as means to establish precedents for wider 
trade agreements and to soften opposition to them. 
•  Using trade negotiations to lock in of domestic market-oriented reforms.   
•  Strengthening strategic partnerships.  
 
As a defensive reaction, the EU, by proposing the creation of a “strategic 
partnership” with Latin America and the Caribbean, is trying to avoid having its 
presence on the continent reduced. It also wants to avoid being isolated from 
participation in the development of the new international trade rules. A rivalry 
has surfaced between the US and the EU for such intermediary inter-regionalist 
projects. The EU, following a path similar to that of the US, has, since the mid 
1990s, pursued a policy of replacing non-reciprocal preferential agreements 
with developing countries in the Mediterranean, Latin America and South Africa, 
with bilateral PTAs. Ten agreements have been concluded under the EU’s 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Programme and three further agreements 
were reached with South Africa, Mexico and Chile. At the same time, the EU is 
conducting negotiations with Mercosur and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries to replace non-reciprocal preference accords under the 
Cotonou Agreement (Mc Queen, 2002). While the agreement with 
Mediterranean countries seemed to be encouraged by security and immigration 
imperatives
3 and the African one by political concerns
4, the agreements with 
Latin American countries are best interpreted as driven by economic reasons.   
                                             
*Attempts on the part of the EU to include animal welfare ion the agenda of international trade 
negotiations is a case in point. Determined lobbying by groups led to the Treaty of Amsterdam 
including a “Protocol on the Protection and Welfare of Animals” and several CAP statutes refer 
to animal welfare and even establish minimum standards. Including animal welfare has been 
resisted by farmers who view it as an additional cost and by developing countries who tend to   12
 
BOX 1: EU INVESTMENT IN MERCOSUR 
 
To understand the EU’s pursuit of a trade agreement with Mercosur it is 
important to keep in mind the increased exposure of European firms in the 
region. Since the early 1990s foreign direct investment from Europe grew 
dramatically, as firms saw opportunities created by privatizations, economic 
opening and increased stability in macro-economic policies. This development 
has led to what can only be described as corporate driven negotiating tactics 
and goals. The FDI flows from Europe have been concentrated at two levels. 
First, Spain took the lead ahead of other heavily exposed national investors, 
with Italy, France, Germany and Holland trailing behind. The wave of Spanish 
investments in LA in the 1990s is unprecedented for its magnitude and pace, 
representing a turning point and contributing to the internationalization of the 
Spanish economy. These investments represent a high proportion of the firms’ 
turnover. Second, there has been a heavy emphasis in certain sectors with 
investment in the telecommunications, financial services, electricity generation 
and distribution standing out. Trade in goods also increased exponentially. This 
increase follows the classic model of North-South trade patterns. While the EU 
accounts for approximately 26 percent of Mercosur’s external trade, making it 
the region’s principal trading partner, the South American bloc represents only 
2.9 percent of the EU’s trade. Moreover, the exchange is skewed in terms of the 
traded products with Mercosur’s sales concentrated in agricultural products and 




EU bilateralism is more timid than that of the US, but after the failure of the 
FTAA negotiations in Buenos Aires in 2001, the bloc tried to speed up 
negotiations with Mercosur. Some analysts pointed out that the EU is planning 
to offer Mercosur “tempting” preferential market shares in order to soften 
Argentina’s and Brazil’s fight to reduce agricultural subsidies in the WTO and 
thus drive a wedge in the G-20. In fact, during the EU-Mercosur Ministerial 
meeting that took place in November 2003 the EU policymakers insisted on the 
necessity of obtaining a WTO-plus agreement with Mercosur in contrast to the 
so-called FTAA “light” that grew out after the disagreements in the Miami 
meeting in 2003. In fact, the EU negotiating stance has always reacted to the 
                                                                                                                                  
see the whole broadening of agricultural functions as an attempt of freeze their products out of 
Europe’s markets.  
3 See the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and the Common Strategy adopted by the European 
Council in 2000.  
4 Reinforcement of democracy, peace and stability in the region.    13
status of FTAA negotiations. When, after Miami and to this date, FTAA stalled, 
the Europeans became more intransigent in their demands on Mercosur.  
 
EU pressure on Mercosur is taking place in two different dimensions. First, it 
insists that issues of investment and government procurement, though left aside 
after the Cancun meeting, are still key elements of the bilateral negotiations. In 
this vein, the aim is to bind market regulations that protect European 
corporations which compete with the US in Latin America. These are touchy 
issues for Mercosur given that a common policy is still fledging. Second, it has 
claimed that the EU-Mercosur negotiations are in a decisive stage and that 
without rapid progress, the EU would lose interest in pursuing an agreement. 
Such urgency is tied to the idea of developing an alliance that can be useful in 
the Doha round by undermining the leadership role Brazil has played in the G-
20 coalition.  
 
In line with this position, the EU attempted to make an appealing offer in April 
2004 that, for the first time since the negotiations began, included 950 sensitive 
foodstuff products. Mercosur, in turn, is offering concessions on investment 
rules and services. However, the informal basis of the talks, plus the lengthy 
schedules proposed for liberalizing tariffs on these sensitive items, created 
doubts that a deep agreement would be reached any time soon. In addition, 
most of the items in which the liberalization offer was improved favor Brazilian 
interests. The EU has proposed a tempting offer to Brazil because it concluded 
that more benefits can be obtained in this country compared to Argentina, 
where most services were liberalized during the 1990s.  In this sense, Argentina 
has a weaker trade-off capacity at the negotiating table. Even though the EU 
offer signified important progress, exporters in Mercosur fear that such 
concessions may turn out to be quite worthless in practice because of non 
tariffs barriers and subsidies to domestic production. 
 
This strategy is not new in the region. The first free trade agreement signed by 
the EU with a partner outside Europe was with Mexico. In this case, the creation 
of NAFTA triggered the interest as the EU wanted to prevent discrimination 
against its producers and exporters in that market. These negotiations   14
advanced quite fast and in March 2000, after nine rounds of negotiations, an 
agreement was signed that included a democratic clause, a point over which 
Mexico initially expressed reluctance. The agreement included a schedule for 
free trade in goods, dispositions about government procurement, cooperation in 
policy competition, consultations about intellectual property and dispute 
settlement. 
 
In the same vein, the EU signed a Framework Agreement for Cooperation with 
Chile to achieve a political and economic association. Contrary to expectations, 
the negotiations with Chile advanced faster and over-took the on-going talks 
with Mercosur: the Association Agreement was signed in November 2002.  
 
These agreements with Mexico and Chile were concluded more easily for 
specific reasons. Mexico has a non-conflictive agenda with the EU as its 
potential exports do not impinge on EU protectionism. In the Chilean case the 
agreement was facilitated not only by the non-sensitive agenda but also by 
Chile’s already very open trade policies. In addition, the coetaneous free trade 
agreement negotiations between Chile and the US whetted the EU´s appetite  
to sign the agreement promptly.   
 
Mercosur is only a pawn in the EU’s strategy of signing bilateral agreements. In 
fact, the EU trades on a most-favoured-nation basis with only selected countries 
(among them Australia, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan and the 
US). Interest in Mercosur is the product of mixed motivations, strategic 
calculations and market interest. The EU-Mercosur case seems to have clear 
strategic calculations as it could imply the weakening of the G-20 alliance in the 
WTO and avoiding the costs of exclusion the FTAA might bring about.  
 
BOX 2: AGRICULTURE AS A STUMBLING BLOCK  
To no one’s surprise, the potential deal breaker in the EU-Mercosur talks is 
agriculture. Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is responsible for the 
South American region’s widening trade gap with the EU and although there 
appeared to be some flexibility within the Union, repeated stonewalling by the 
Dutch, French and Irish ministers of agriculture and fisheries, backed by special 
interest groups, have repeatedly blocked any serious openings, especially in the 
areas where the Mercosur countries are most competitive (beef, cereals,   15
sugar). The EU has employed a number of strategies to stall, without outright 
killing, an agreement. By way of example three can be mentioned: the 
arguments supporting the “multifunctional” role of agriculture in Europe, the 
insistence on only dealing with agricultural subsidies within the WTO, and the 
demand that mutual openness should advance proportionally in both blocs. The 
latter procedure was rejected because each block has a different initial average 
tariff level: while the EU has an average of 6 percent, Mercosur applies a 14 
percent charge; this difference poses a greater burden on Mercosur which has 
been demanding special and differential treatment. As it now stands, the EU 
offer to increase quotas for specific agricultural products has proved insufficient. 
For one thing, it offer to increase quotas would go into effect for only half the 
affected products at the conclusion of the EU-Mercosur negotiations while the 
other half would come into force only with the conclusion of the Doha Round.  
Afraid that domestic subsidies might neutralize access, Mercosur has dug in its 
heels, insisting on broader concessions on non-tariff barriers and seasonal price 
adjustments. Mercosur has also made clear that the zero-by-zero reciprocal 
offer on 326 processed agricultural products (dairy, cooking oil, chocolates etc.) 
is unacceptable because Mercosur does not have the equivalent panoply of 
domestic subsidies.. In addition, Mercosur has made a reservation stipulating 
that its own offer is made conditional to a revision of results of accession of the 
ten new members to the EU as most of new entrants have similar competitive 
structures. 
 
The bilateral trade agenda is dominated by the comparative advantage of 
Mercosur, particularly in agricultural products, and the protection and subsidies 
the EU applies to these product categories. This helps explain why it is 
impossible to understand the reasoning behind such a bilateral agreement 
without taking into account other strategic negotiations that are taking place. 
The FTAA negotiations launched in Miami in December 1994 and the myriad 
bilateral negotiations the US is conducting with Latin American countries forced 
the EU to look for a balance in the trade relations between Mercosur and the 
EU. The EU wants to prevent any potential trade diversion that the FTAA and 
the bilateral agreements could produce in the hemisphere.  
 
For Mercosur, negotiations with the EU also have political meaning. Formal 
conversations with the Bloc imply recognition for its customs union. Moreover, it 
signals Mercosur’s preference for the EU model of integration in contrast to 
models, such as that of the US, that are narrowly market based. While the EU is 
perceived in Mercosur as less threatening than the US, this perception owes 
more to the aggressive image that the US government has in the region than to 
an actual assessment of EU trade and investment policies. The EU has used its   16
pro-development approach to promote its external trade policies as evidenced 
by the Inter-regional Association Agreement’s inclusion of chapters on 
cooperation and political dialogue.  
 
How it works: Unequal bargaining in practice -   
The EU-Mercosur agreement and CAFTA 
 
Why do Latin American countries agree to bilateral agreements that undermine 
their bargaining power in the FTAA and the WTO? One important explanation is 
rooted in the fact that several countries fear the phase-out of non-reciprocal 
agreements which contain preferences granted on a discretional base. The 
most widespread example is the General System of Preferences, which 
coexists with the US and Canada Andean Trade Preferences Act and the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative. Bilateral trade agreements are a way of 
guaranteeing these benefits on a binding basis. Binding, in turn, requires 
reciprocity. Most important in the case of Central American and the Caribbean 
is the panic provoked by the phase out of the Textile and Garment agreement at 
the end of 2005 that will eliminate quotas, which, restrictive as they might have 
been, guaranteed access to the US market. The elimination of quotas, it is 
feared, will lead to a free-for-all with China’s highly competitive industry. 
 
In this vein, microeconomic export interests exert powerful pressures on the 
conclusion of agreements. Paradoxically, these microeconomic interests are 
sometimes represented by multinational corporations that are dominant in the 
Latin American markets. In other words, business interests are represented on 
both sides of the negotiating table. Fruit companies Chiquita and Del Monte are 
prominent examples in Central America, companies that for decades controlled 
Central American republics, and gave origin to the epithet “banana republic”.   
In Mercosur investment by Spanish firms has transformed the ownership 
structure of major sectors such as telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, 
financial services and hydrocarbons posing a major challenge to regulatory 
authorities.  
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According to the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC,2003), in the 
last decades three trends of export specialization can be identified in the Latin 
American region. First, there is integration in the North-South trade flows of 
manufactured goods mainly destined for the US market and characterized by 
the off-shore processing industries of Mexico and some Central American and 
Caribbean countries. Second, South American countries are integrating into to 
South-South trade flows. These countries have more diversified trade based on 
exports to regional markets. Even though basic product exports have been 
reduced in total regional trade, in Mercosur and the Andean Community exports 
of basic products and manufactured goods based on natural resources still 
represent a high percentage in the total external sales (58% Mercosur, 86% 
Andean Community). Third, in some Caribbean countries and Panama, the 
export of services, particularly those related to tourism, finance and 
transportation, are becoming very important.  
 
While this is a very simplistic classification of export specialization, it sheds light 
on the potential interests of each group of countries in the FTAA and bilateral 
negotiations. In sum, except for Mercosur which has a special economic 
relationship with the EU, the rest of Latin America remains highly dependent on 
the US as a destiny for its exports and source of direct investment flows. 
 
In the case of CAFTA countries, which already have duty-free access to the US 
market for many of their exports, the free-trade pact is supposed to further 
reduce barriers, cutting the Central American countries’ tariffs on 80 percent of 
US-made industrial and consumer goods, and phasing out the remaining tariffs 
over 10 years. The CAFTA sectors with greater opportunities in the agreement 
are mainly textiles and garment producers which are present in all the countries, 
but are more prominent in Honduras and El Salvador. Other industrial sectors 
expected to gains are the electronics industry (Costa Rica), medical equipments 
(Costa Rica), pharmaceuticals (Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala), 
chemicals and chemical by-products (El Salvador and Costa Rica), paper and 
paper by-products (El Salvador and Nicaragua) (Nowalski and Osterlof, 2004).  
In some of these sectors American presence is dominant. In the agricultural 
sector, fresh and preserved foods are stand to gain, including pineapples,   18
melons, flowers, plants, cigars, vegetables and pulses, tubers and roots. In 
some cases the commercialization of agricultural products depends on 
transnational enterprises such as Chiquita and Del Monte. 
 
US offensive interests have been satisfied by the elimination of duties on 80 
percent of all industrial goods exported to CAFTA countries. The big winners of 
the agreement are information technology, construction equipment, paper 
products, chemicals, medical and scientific equipment. In addition, the 
agreement wipes out duties on US (subsidized) farm exports, including cotton, 
rice, wheat, soybeans, as well as processed foods, fruits and vegetables and 
cuts of beef. CAFTA also agrees to open its market to US telecoms, banks, 
insurers, retailers, express-delivery couriers, travel and transport firms, 
advertising agencies,. It also allows freer movement of professional services 
such as engineering and accounting. At the same time Zoellick pointed out that 
the deal would give WTO-plus protection for patented drugs, copyrighted 
movies and software, internet domain names and other intellectual property.  
 
In the case of Mercosur-EU agreement, Europe’s mercantilist interests are not 
only related with the increased access to the markets and natural resources in 
the area. Brazil and Argentina have been a focal point of European FDI 
investment outside the OECD area. For an indication of the significance of EU 
penetration, half of FDI in Argentina and Brazil is European and half of that is 
Spanish These investments have been concentrated in the manufacturing 
sector and particularly in chemicals, machinery and transport equipment. 
Privatization of state-owned companies since the early 1990s led to new FDI 
opportunities in services, strengthening the focus that EU investors have had on 
Brazil and Argentina. EU investors taken together hold around 35 percent of the 
FDI stocks and were in the first half of the 1990s more important than US 
investors in Argentina and Brazil. (Nunnenkamp, 2002) This trend grew 
throughout the second half of the 1990s led by Spain. Spain became in both 
larger countries of Mercosur the most important EU investor replacing traditional 
German and Italian leadership. (See Box below.) Largely due to Spanish FDI 
the sectoral composition of the EU’s total FDI in Mercosur veered heavily 
toward the service sector. Hence trade agreements are heavily inclined to   19
protect the business climate for such interests, with a concern for continuous 
opening of market segments for European utility providers and banking. 
 
It is important to take into account that trade with the EU accounts for one-fourth 
of Mercosur imports and exports. However, Mercosur exports are concentrated 
in a narrow group of products. The majority of these products are associated to 
agricultural commodities and foodstuffs. In this sense, Mercosur gains with an 
interregional agreement are much more concentrated while EU gains are more 
evenly spread as they comprise a large portfolio of diversified exports plus all 
regulations related to investment and services. In order to protect its food 
production the EU has made its offer of market access conditional on the strict 
protection of denominations of origin for wines, spirits, dairy products, cold cuts, 
etc. Were this provision to be accepted, it would apply to approximately 600 
products. In fisheries the offer was made conditional on access to fishing rights 
in coastal waters.  
 
Prime movers of the trade agreement are the chemical, petrochemical and 
related industries, in which EU enterprises, such as Bayer and Unilever, 
dominate the Mercosur market and are keen to streamline investments. 
Mercosur’s products with export opportunities that have received stingy market 
access offers are in sectors such as beef and edible meat offal; poultry, fish, 
crustaceous and mollusks and vegetables, fruits, nuts and food preparations. 
As can be seen, the predominance of the food and agricultural products is 
remarkable. Brazil is today a leading producer of sugar, poultry and by-products 
while Argentina and Uruguay have great potential in beef and dairy products. 
Particularly important for Brazil are textiles and some products in the electrical 
and electronic equipment sector (Valladao, 2004).  
 
A case in point: TRIPS in CAFTA and the EU-Mercosur negotiations 
 
Intellectual property was first introduced as a trade issue in the Uruguay Round 
during which agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Poperty (TRIPs) was 
reached. In regional and bilateral agreements the objective is often to deepen 
these existing provisons, i.e., they are WTO-plus.     20
 
The main objective of the draft of the chapter on IPRs in the Mercosur- EU 
Agreement is to ensure adequate and effective protection of IPRs in line with 
WTO standards. The scope of the proposal includes the same eight categories 
that comprise the TRIPs agreement (copyright, trademark, geographic 
indications, industrial designs, and patents, layouts designs of integrated 
circuits, undisclosed information and clause of control of anti-competitive 
practices in licenses). However, some substantial differences between both 
parties have come to light. The EU, on one hand, is seeking, among other 
things, the accession to thirteen international conventions related to intellectual 
property, including, for example, the Paris Convention’s protection of industrial 
property, the Bern Convention’s of artistic works and the Rome Convention’s of 
phonograms and broadcasting. The EU is currently asking Mercosur countries 
to strengthen IPR law enforcement. The intention is to force Mercosur countries 
to establish a similar IPR enforcement law to the one put in force in Europe this 
year.  
 
Mercosur, on the other hand, has asked for provisions stating the need for a 
balance between intellectual property rights, access to genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge. The Mercosur proposal aims to ensure exceptions and is 
based on the argument that nothing should prevent parties from taking 
measures which promote public health, nutrition and other areas of public 
interest in sectors of vital importance for development.
5 
  
Mercosur countries want to guarantee that they may take measures to prevent 
the unfair use of IPRs by rights holders or the use of practices that limit trade in 
an unjustifiable manner or adversely affect technology transfer. To those ends, 
they propose recognition of sovereign rights over natural resources, including 
                                             
5  Mercosur has a Harmonization Protocol of Norms on Intellectual Property which has been waiting for 
ratification with other protocols dealing with non tariff trade issues, such as investment and trade defense 
measures. The Protocol on Intellectual Property addresses primarily trademarks (in some depth) and 
geographical indications, but touches on other IPR issues only briefly. The original MERCOSUR 
agreement did not explicitly make a reference to IPRs. A subsequent protocol, the Harmonization 
Protocol of Norms on Intellectual Property in the MERCOSUR Regarding Trademarks, Indications of 
Source and Denominations of Origin (1996), will, once it is in effect, ensure harmonisation in the 
treatment of certain IPRs issues among the parties to the agreement.   21
genetic resources and traditional knowledge. More broadly, the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs must contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and the transfer of technology.  
 
Controversy concentrates on WTO-plus issues, in particular the EU “claw-back” 
policy to pursue recognition of geographical indications by means of bilateral 
trade agreements which supersede the obligations incurred under the WTO. 
The issues being faced can be seen most clearly in the discussion over trade in 
wine products. In the EU- Mercosur agreement, negotiations are being held at 
bi-regional and bilateral levels to facilitate and promote wine trade. The EU has 
a regional mandate to negotiate with Mercosur, i.e., it has no authorization to 
negotiate bilaterally with any of the Mercosur country-members. However, due 
to the strong competition between EU and Argentinean wine producing sectors, 
pressure was brought to bear during the Madrid Summit in 2002 and it was 
agreed that the Agreement on Wines and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement (SPS), would be negotiated bilaterally. At some future point, the 
agreement will become part of the bi-regional accord.  
 
 
In the US-CAFTA Agreement the chapter on intellectual property rights required 
Central American governments to incorporate a number of new international 
protocols that favour the protection of trademarks and patent rules. (See Chart 
1) These include new restrictions on and dispute facilities for electronic 
communications, such as the internet, and define communication frequencies 
as property. This area of negotiation was a one-way street given the highly 
unequal distribution of patents between the U.S. and Central America, or the 
capacity of the latter to acquire them. 
 
Chart 1: Central America and US: Instruments of Intellectual Property included in the US-CAFTA 
Agreement and its necessities of ratification 
Date to entry into force 
(agreed in CAFTA) 
Convention or Treaty  Ratified by  Should ratify  
At the entry into force of 
CAFTA 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(1996) 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and US 
- 
 WIPO  Performances  and 
Phonograms Treaty (1996) 




1st January 2006  Patent Cooperation Treaty,  Costa Rica, Nicaragua, US  El  Salvador,  Honduras,   22
according to its revision 
(1970) 
Guatemala 
  Budapest Treaty on the 
International Recognition 
of the Deposit of 
Microorganisms  for the 
Purposes of Patent 
Procedure  
US  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua 
1st January 2008   Convention Relating to the 
Distribution of Programme-
Carrying Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, US  El  Salvador,  Honduras, 
Guatemala 
  Trademark  Law  Treaty  US  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala 
Nicaragua 06/01/2010 
Costa Rica 06/01/2007 
All the others 06/01/2006 
International Convention 
for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (1991). 
US  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua 
Each part should conduct the 
necessary efforts to ratify:   
Patent  Law  Treaty  (2000)  US  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua 
 Hague  Agreement 
Concerning the 
International Deposit of 
Industrial Designs (1999) 
-  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, US 
 Madrid  Agreement 
Concerning the 
International Registration 
of Marks  (1989) 
US  Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua 
Source: Acuña-Alfaro, Nowalski-Rowinski and Osterlof-Obregon (2004) 
 
The Central American governments initially signalled that they would not accept 
an intellectual property proposal that failed to reach a balance between the 
need for technological innovation and the socio-economic welfare of the region. 
In the end, CAFTA countries conceded to a TRIPs plus chapter that limits the 
grounds for revoking patents, secures protections for test data and trade 
secrets for 5-10 years and severely inhibits access to generic drugs. The 
agreement extends the rights of the holder of the patent from 50 to 70 years 
and also strengthens the position of multinationals in cracking down on 
copyright violations, ensuring the ability to award monetary damages even 
when assigning a monetary value to the violation is difficult. 
 
Patents are the central focus. Patent rights were not extended and remain at 20 
years.  However, CAFTA commits Central American countries to protect “newly 
developed plant varieties,” an issue promoted by leading biotechnological firms  
such as Monsanto and Dow Chemical. Drug test data was also an issue of 
concern. As agreed, information submitted regarding the trials conducted will be 
prohibited from being made public for an additional number of years so as to 
ensure safety of any new drug introduced to local markets. The test data is 
considered a necessity for reproducing the drug by local firms. In this vein, the 
CAFTA countries have conceded that withheld drug and chemical test   23
information or trade secrets will be protected for five years for medicines and for 
ten years for agrochemicals. Royalty payments for surgical or therapeutic 
procedures patented in the US were not accepted. Costa Rica has resisted on 
its own the 5-year rule for test data, and insisted instead on three years and has 
also refused the 10-year protection for test data for chemicals and 
agrochemicals. Central American producers of generic medicines complain that 
the text extended the outreach of U.S. pharmaceutical monopoly to the region.  
 
In the cases of both CAFTA and EU-Mercosur, private sector interests helped to 
shape and drive the positions on IPR issues. In the latter, the European 
negotiators are, at the general level, anxious to bring Mercosur into compliance 
with the enforcement mechanisms that the EU has recently adopted. However, 
many side issues, such as recognition of geographical indications, respond to 
the demands of specific business interests. Results of the discussions remain 
unclear as the EU does confront fairly sophisticated counterparts, especially in 
the Brazilian team. In CAFTA, on the other hand, U.S. pressure was almost 
invincible on every point. This is most clear with regard to patent protection 
where the power of pharmaceutical companies were able to weigh in, except on 
issues that Costa Rican negotiators stood firm. So while, CAFTA’s IPR results 
confirm the difficulties of unequal bargaining in RTAs, it also shows that 
determined, well informed small country officials can make a difference. 
 
 
Investment and Services: Two means to the same end  
 
 
A brief review of Investment as a sub-category of trade negotiations clearly reveals 
the degree to which the issues involved are contentious and why many developing 
countries are resisting the inclusion of the so-called Singapore Issues, Investment 
being one, in the Doha Round. 
 
In 1996, a Working Group was established during the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference to examine the connections between trade and investment. The principle 
question was whether or not to attempt to negotiate an agreement on investment 
within the multilateral negotiations. At Doha, the only step taken was to mandate a   24
study to clarify what would be involved in such negotiations. While a decision was to 
be taken in Cancun in September, 2003, the firm resistance by the G-20 to such a 
broadening of the agenda turned Investment into one of the main sticking points and 
a major reason for the acrimonious impasse that terminated the Conference. 
 
Positions on Investment break down between developed countries and developing 
countries, in turn split into two camps.  
Developed countries want safeguards for their external investments extended into 
the multilateral sphere. Moreover, multinational companies are pressing for 
investment security as part of their strategic expansion recognizing that the 
competition for future markets is less in access to market share or tariff 
considerations and more in security for direct foreign investments in emerging 
markets. This vision is also strongly shared by financial services firms which are 
eager to have portfolio investments included in the definition of the category 
•  The first group of developing countries are those that have already signed 
bilateral trade agreements that include Investment protection clauses. For 
them, the issue may be a dead letter with important trading partners and/or 
exclusively a question to be treated within the WTO.  
•  The second group of developing countries include some of the largest 
developing economies, that have limited bilateral accords and/or belong to 
regional trade and economic organizations that are sceptical of the Singapore 
issues. In addition, there are countries such as India, China and Brazil that 
reserve the right to treat investment security within the framework of national 
economic development plans.  
 
Within this context, the G-20 Plus can be understood as an effort to arrive at a 
consensus among both sets of developing countries on how to approach Investment 
and the other Singapore Issues within the Doha Round and the WTO.  
 
These tensions extended to the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, where one of the most divisive issues has been whether investment 
should be treated in the chapter on services ( under Mode 3) or in a separate chapter 
on investment.  Where this question is addressed matters less than the disciplines   25
that are eventually agreed on the “right to commercial establishment”. Both 
approaches are compatible with GATS Article V on economic integration.  
 
To look more closely at how the investment protection issue is currently being played 
out, it is useful to examine its place in CAFTA and in the EU-Mercosur discussions. 
The two agreements show contrasting approaches to the issue. In the case of 
CAFTA the US has sought a broad chapter on the regulation of investment with a 
definition of investment that goes far beyond GAT provisions on commercial 
establishment. This is coupled with widespread liberalization through negative lists in 
the services protocol, an approach that liberalizes all sectors except those 
specifically mentioned in reservations. This is known as the top-down approach. In 
the top-down approach all non-conforming measures for which no explicit 
reservations have been made must be eliminated. Known as the “list it or lose it” 
obligation, this approach does not allow for the introduction of future regulations for 
sectors on which there is no current clear definition of objectives and policies. It 
tends to favour those countries with a more developed regulatory framework since 
those with fewer regulations cannot register reservations in sectors without 
regulatory regimes. Because the approach is so wide-ranging it also hinders the 
evaluation of concessions. (Abugattas Majluf and Stephenson, 2003)  Another 
consequence of regulatory agreements also needs to be flagged: they will make the 
strategic promotion of domestic firms in competition with foreign companies much 
more difficult.  
 
In contrast, the EU, as the leading investor in Mercosur, has not been keen to 
significantly deepen the current level of liberalization but, rather, seeks to protect the 
status quo. In this vein, in the chapter on investment the EU demands the phasing 
out of several specific domestic regulations that interfere with EU investor interests in 
Mercosur, such as the banning of foreign investment in frontier areas, the 
commitment to hire a share of local workers in the labour force, non discrimination in 
investment and technological incentives, etc. In contrast to the agreements pursued 
by the US it excludes provisions on expropriations, which is unsurprising since the 
EC law has no rules in such areas and each member state retains full competence 
on these issues.    26
Liberalization is pursued in a bit-by-bit manner or bottom-up; it makes a targeted 
attempt to open very particular market niches that remain under government 
regulation: Through positive lists included in the services annexes, liberalization is 
undertaken only in the scheduled services items and the modes of supply for which 
countries adopt specific commitments.  The risk with this approach is that the status 
quo may become bound – a risk that in the absence of competition policy, leads to 
favouring the incumbent players.   
 
Turning first to CAFTA, the main goal of the US has been to establish standards for 
the protection of its foreign investors and to remain ahead in the strategic 
competition for rule creation on these issues. According to the USTR, the agreement 
will provide the full range of safeguards that the US has consistently looked for and 
received, most recently in the bilateral agreement with Chile. CAFTA has a separate 
chapter on investment which allows a very broad definition of investment, extending 
to debt, intellectual property, sub-contracting and concessions. Chapter 11 seeks to 
create favourable conditions for foreign investment, including national treatment and 
most favoured nation and allowing investor – state dispute settlement. US investors 
are, essentially, provided with the full rights to establish and conduct businesses in 
Central America on equal footing with national investors and any others with whom 
the countries have pre-existing agreements. The chapter specifies provisions for due 
process protection and reimbursement at fair market value in the event of direct and 
indirect expropriation. Interestingly, this policy thrust will also apply to financial 
services where Central America seems to have ceded access to US banking 
institutions in exchange for expanded market share in agricultural products.  
 
In sum, the US signalled in CAFTA that, while, in the light of Brazilian objections, it 
backtracked in Miami on these issues being dealt with under FTAA, their inclusion 
remains a fundamental policy objective. Through CAFTA, it has shown how a 
regional agreement can open a back door to accords that cannot yet be reached in 
the multilateral arena.  
 
A brief overview of the stalled negotiations between the EU and Mercosur reveal 
another potential pattern in dealing with Investment (and possibly other Singapore 
issues). Anxious to hold on to the advances made in the last decade by European   27
firms, especially Spanish and Italian, and defending its position as Mercosur’s most 
important trading partner, the EU was anxious to show through this negotiation that it 
is more flexible and friendly than the US. For those reasons, many of the sticky 
issues effecting Investment were finessed. For example, portfolio investment was 
excluded, the positive list approach was accepted, and agreement on a state-
investor dispute settlement mechanism and TRIMs modifications are not on the 
table.  
 
What is interesting is that, even with the omission of these contentious points, the 
two blocs have been unable to overcome the essential impasse: investment 
protection versus increased opening of the European agricultural markets. The 
quotas for agricultural export were not generous enough to attract interested 
exporters. The internal asymmetries within Mercosur are an important factor. While 
Brazil had to make greater concessions in terms of liberalizing investment and 
services sectors, Argentina was dissatisfied with the European offer in fruits, dairy 
products and beef. Thus neither of them was in a position to prod the other and 
move the deal forward. 
 
In an effort to side step the disagreements, the EU is attempting to achieve 
Investment safeguards under the Service chapter of the proposed agreement. The 
EU offer is conditional on concessions from Mercosur in the fields of maritime 
services (including feeder services, intra-Mercosur traffic and auxiliary services), 
telecommunications and financial services. For an idea of what is at stake one only 
needs to consider that Brazilian banks currently hold nearly $300 billion in deposits, 
making the market extremely attractive, for example, to Europe’s mature financial 
service firms.  
 
A reduced list of horizontal reservations in the field of investment, notably that 
allowing discriminatory treatment of EU entities regarding incentive schemes and 
technological development, as well and the derogation of commitments to future 
MFN investment regimes within the WTO is countered by the approach in Services. 
There the EU commits only to liberalizing what is listed. The emphasis is on sectors 
in which European investments are dominant (electricity, gas, telecommunications,   28
banking) but in which there are strong pressures to tap into undeveloped market 
niches.  
 
The result, if the EU approach is accepted, would make it the big winner in 
Investment and Services, if only by its having maintained the status quo.  While the 
results may be similar, the CAFTA agreement includes very different mechanisms as 
it includes a generic chapter on Investment based on a negative list approach that 
achieves substantial market access for US firms across the entire Services chapter, 
admitting very few exceptions.  
 
The EU has also requested further commitments in a limited number of areas. In the 
area of government procurement, for example, it has insisted on a market access 
component based on national treatment and MFN. Any offer on procurement, it 
proposes, should be commercially meaningful and cover the most important 
procuring entities. Brazil responded by offering a quota of 3 percent open to 
European firms with local presence. The EU appears to be willing to grant a 
preferential margin for Mercosur bidders as well as a safeguard clause. As with 
Services Protocols the approach is likely to yield success to the degree that 




The world economy has become increasingly open making states more 
interdependent and exposing each country to unprecedented degrees of 
economic competition. The process has especially benefited the transnational 
economic actors. In this sense North/South regionalism contains strategic 
elements. It is distinguished by its pursuit of a particular set of institutional 
arrangements clearly leaning toward the protection of investor rights at the 
expense of developmental needs. This has emerged starkly in CAFTA showing 
how a regional agreement can open a back door to rule creation that cannot yet 
be reached in the multilateral arena. The agreements erode the rights of states 
to regulate, forbidding, for example, all types of performance  requirements 
(barring reservations specified by each country), thus depriving countries of a 
right codified in the multilateral arena.    29
 
Rules make a difference not only in institutional terms but also for their 
distributional impact. Both the agreements on intellectual property and 
investment are a case in point. Transnational enterprises have gained most 
from this change, acquiring more and more power to influence the domestic 
policies of states and the international relations process. Business forums such 
as the MERCOSUR-European Business Forum (MEBF) follow the process 
closely and gain influence with regular contacts and agenda setting meetings. It 
is against this background – of accelerating global competition, the state’s 
weakened control over its national economy and the lack of satisfactory global 
structures – that the development of regional structures has become more 
important in the eyes of governments themselves. This is the basis on which 
Rodrik´s trilemma rests: the unstable cohabitation on international economic 
integration, the nation state and democratic politics. When the political and 
economic choices open to governments become constricted to such an extent, 
the essence of democratic processes is hollowed out.   
 
On one hand, in the interest of “efficient” decision-making and in reaction to 
pressures from developed countries, governments in developing countries are 
more and more biased to maintain negotiations confidential, generating a critical 
democratic deficit. On the other hand, more people are now aware of the extent 
up to which their daily lives and social well-being are affected by secretive 
decisions made by international bureaucrats and demand new channels of 
participation in these decisions. Trade affects the distribution of income, raising 
questions of who gets what and what can be done about it in the political arena.  
 
Markets are social constructions, embedded in sociopolitical systems.  However 
developing country governments face less and less flexibility in establishing the 
parameters within which their markets function, taking into account domestic 
preferences. All in all these negotiations lead to a situation in which the strategic 
promotion of domestic firms vis-a vis foreign competition becomes more 
difficult. Moreover, the extrapolation of neoliberal values and beliefs from 
developed countries circumscribes taking into account that what can be 
considered “fair” in one country may not necessarily be considered in the same   30
way in another. If developing countries continue the race to sign asymmetric 
trade agreements, they will not wither, but their powers will be severely limited 
by the intricate patchwork of international rules that is emerging.    
 
Nonetheless, PTAs continue be pursued because they offer the ability to 
micromanage competition in order to create preferential markets on a global 
scale. The other side of the coin, however, is that in most PTAs reforms are 
oriented to creating conditions favourable to international investors and they 
tend to weaken the voice of labour and civil society actors at large.  As a 
reaction, civil society has taken the road of also internationalizing its voice in 
order to increase its leverage against the naturally non-egalitarian thrust of 
global economic restructuring. Broad cross border social alliances respond to a 
political necessity. Transnational networks of this sort are trying to create new 
channels of participation in order to gain leverage and change the essentially 
anti-democratic nature of the process.   
 
The towering presence of multinational corporations in developing countries 
affects the bargaining choices of host countries. National preferences are 
usually determined by the constraints and opportunities of economic 
interdependence while the outcomes of interstate bargains are determined by 
the relative bargaining power of governments and their need to expand markets 
and attract foreign investment. So far trade negotiations further integrating 
national economies have been corporate driven.  Civil society, composed of 
people and groups seeking alternatives to the pressure of multinational firms, 
the erosion of the regulatory role of the state has come out as authorized voice 
of the opposition to the democratic deficit.  
 
 
Red Lights in Negotiations  
 
•  The response of developing countries to inequalities of bargaining power 
should be to focus on negotiations where they can improve their power 
through alliances with other countries with similar interests. Negotiations 
in bloc are prone to obtain more equilibrated balances. Weaker countries   31
are likely to make the greatest gains through bloc coalitions. As market 
power is the most important source to shape bargaining power, alliances 
with other countries are the key to enhancing the power of the weak.  
•  Developing countries must learn to resist and negotiate very hard. Even 
though they face several asymmetries they should use bloc coalition 
strategies to overcome their lack of resources and strategic thinking.   
Coalition strategies may be inherently unstable but they serve to 
overcome relative weaknesses and reduced shares in international trade 
and investment flows.  
•  Trade policy is an inherently distributive instrument whereby employment 
in import competing sectors is exchanged for employment in export 
oriented sectors. The trade-offs are usually hidden from view resulting in 
a situation in which the compromises made come to the fore when the 
process is concluded and when compliance is socially and politically 
costly.  
•  If relevant sectors are left aside with no chance of winning distributional 
conflicts and, at the same time democracy does not improve the material 
conditions of losers, those who expect to suffer continued deprivation are 
forced to find alternative ways to channel their discontent. Such 
discontent has so far not been used by developing country governments 
to strengthen their bargaining power in the negotiating table. As 
democratic rule expands in developing countries, Congresses should be 
asked to play a role as a catalyst between dissatisfied local demands 
and the Executive leading trade negotiations in opaque manners. 
•  Developing countries should enhance cooperation among networks 
composed by civil servants, businesses, academics and civil society at 
large to pool resources, raise awareness of costs and benefits and to 
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